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Nigeria as it is constituted today depict a picture typical of a semi-democratic entity that 
is undergoing a demographic transition process, where the large fraction of the total 
population is represented by youth with high propensity for violence.  Achieving political 
stability in the country, therefore revolve around the existence of a workable democracy 
which can improve government performance and thus reduce the sources of grievances 
capable of generating anti-government violence by the youth. However, it is the 
conception of this paper that, in Nigeria the political and the socio-economic principles 
associated with the liberal democracy are either weakly internalized or remained largely 
not internalized across the body polity thereby creating room for grievance hence the 
persistent incidence of violence, as democracy fails to deliver its promises of good 
governance and economic stability. Such violence therefore interacts perversely with 
democratic institutions, eroding their legitimacy and effectiveness thereby engendering 
insecurity. Living in the midst of violence and insecurity thus transforms the youth’s 
perceptions of their physical and political environments which invariably weaken their 
commitment to democracy and encourage them to support forms of authority from non-
state actors such as Boko Haram in the North-Eastern geo-political zone and bodies of 
organized crime perpetrators who specialized in cattle rustling, kidnapping and banditry 
in the North-West geo-political zone. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Nigeria’s return to democratic governance in 1999 was applauded both domestically 
and internationally due to the long and tortuous history of military dictatorship in the 
country. Among Nigerians there were and remain high hopes of the supposed gains of 
democratization. But, as events have shown, the hope and expectation is threatened by 
unceasing violence and war, which have consumed thousands of lives, made thousands 
more internally displaced and properties worth millions of dollars destroyed (Ibrahim, 
2017). Boko Haram has been on the rise in the North Eastern geo-political zone in the 
last nine years, while the incidence of cattle rustling, banditry and kidnapping in the north-
western and central regions has been rising over the last five years. The Nigerian state 
appears to be at war and has almost lost its violence monopoly in 2014, especially in the 
north-eastern part of the country (Ijere, 2015; Rotimi, 2020).  
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However, events after the 2015 general election that led to the invasion of the Sambisa 
Forest-Boko Haram's hide-out by the Nigerian military and the rescue of many women 
and children demonstrate how the battle for state power can form the nature of the state's 
governance and devotion to issues of national importance (Ijere, 2015). It is still evident 
that in northern Nigeria, levels of violence did not decrease, many people felt unsafe in 
that parts of the Nigerian society, with women and young people under the age of 30 
feeling this strongly. In some of these societies, confidence in the state's ability to protect 
them was also not evident. (Onimisi, & Tinuola, 2019). 
 
Given the fact that Nigeria as a country is passing through democratic transitions, couple 
with the fact that security sector reform has been and continue to be the emphasizing 
factor by external donors since the democratization processes of the 1980s got underway, 
it is therefore reasonable to ask why democracy had not reduced or tamed this violence? 
why do the Northern region shows ever increasing insecurity, often attributable to non-
state armed actors? 
 
Answers to the above questions lies on the fact that democratic states are not built through 
institutional evolution alone: organized citizens play a role as well. Therefore, when a 
body polity is unjust in its distributional patterns, it kills the possibility of a national 
consensus and conflicts and violence are bound to emerge and persist, and where violence 
persisted, its impedes citizen’s action, thereby thwarting the development of democracy 
(Uwakwe, & Nwaneri, 2017). This is because when the rudiments of democracy are not 
fully internalized or are weakly internalized, it practically losses its capacity to mitigate 
grievances and when democracy fails to mitigate grievances it becomes enmeshed in 
greater conflict and violence. 
 
Although, democracies do not appear to satisfy basic needs universally, in the sense that 
both opportunities and grievances are present in democratic regimes around the world. 
However, it is claimed that democracies offer peaceful mechanisms through which it can 
influence public policy, hence Østby (2008) suggests that if these do not then reduce the 
gap between the expected and actual outcomes for the relatively disadvantaged group, the 
outcome may be greater frustration and conflict. 
 
It is therefore apparent from the above background that in a democratic entity with 
ineffective regulative and distributive policies capable of reducing the sources of 
grievances, violence tended to reproduce itself rather than diminish. This led us to the 
main theme of this paper which revolves around the pervasive interfaces between 
democracy, violence, security and its implications on youth in Northern Nigeria, which 
will be explored through an extensive review of relevant academic literature. 
 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Nigeria as it is constituted today, is struggling in the midst of social grievances and 
political frustration by its citizens, a development that makes some researchers to start 
questioning whether the country is indeed a democratic state, in the sense that as 
confirmed by the available literature democratic states are more responsive than 
autocracies to group grievances (Ezeibe, 2020). However, in contrast the Nigerian 
democracy is characterized with sharp socioeconomic horizontal inequalities, existing 
side by side with a seemingly politically inclusive system.  As shown by evidence 
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inequalities of all kinds correlate strongly with violence (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). 
Evidence further shows that while democracies with low horizontal inequalities are the 
least at risk of conflict, those with high levels of such inequalities are particularly at higher 
risk (Nwachukwu, 2018).  
 
It is also argued that the violence potential of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities may 
be stronger for democracies and semi-democracies than for autocracies (Yunusa, 2016). 
This is because the combination of increased expectations for democratic dividends and 
the attendant frustration resulting from an unequal social structures and opportunities 
appears to generate increased levels of violence in semi-democratic country.  
 
The literature we have reviewed so far draws our attention to weaknesses in a semi-
democracy, particularly in ethnically diverse societies like Nigeria, in guaranteeing civil 
peace in the sense that democracies have a potential for waves of violence, or even 
continuously high levels of violence, if the in-built tensions of the liberal inclusionary 
project reach a continuously high levels (Angerbrandt, 2018). 
 
Against the above background, the pervasive interface among democracy, violence and 
insecurity in Nigeria is an upshot of weak democratic institutions and a dysfunctional 
federal system. The apparent lack of equity which saw the exclusion of youths in 
governance and the inability of the democratic state to distribute resources equitably in 
the country, have contributed to violent reaction against the state by the youth. Intense 
political competition and the arming of youths, groups and the mobilization of religious 
and ethnic identities by politicians as well as the use of violence for electoral gains are 
also contributory factors (Vickers, 2000, Yusuf, 2019). 
  
Although the recent rebasing of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranks’ the 
country as the largest economy in Africa, it is a truism that most Nigerians are poorer 
today than they were at independence in 1960, the few portion of the youths with strong 
economic wherewithal are in actual sense beneficiaries of the rampant entrenched 
corruption (Yusha’u, Halidu, & Egye, 2020). Unemployment among youths is high 
couple with high level of illiteracy, leading to frustration and alienation which have 
inevitably driven many youths to join groups (ethnic, religious, community or civic) some 
of which have been hijacked by unscrupulous politicians and have become hostile to the 
state. Governance has been characterized by inefficient yet authoritarian centralization, a 
culture of impunity, and a climate of unaccountability dating back to military rule (Yusuf, 
2019).  
 
The combination of aggrieved injustice and the social misery of the majority is producing 
disillusionment with democracy and it is creating conditions of conflict threatening the 
stability of Nigeria’s political order. This prompt us to analyze the nexus between the 
nature and orientation of Nigerian democracy and the high levels of violence and 
insecurity occurring in the country particularly the Northern Region. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This paper intends to revolves around the Human Need theory especially the contribution 
of John Burton (1990). As advocated by Burton: “It is reasonable to assume that human 
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motivations include some that are required for the development of the human species, 
some that are culturally specific, and some that are of a transitory nature …” (Burton 
1990, 36). To differentiate between these forms of motivation, Burton labels them 
respectively, needs, values, and interests. Needs reflect universal motivations and are 
integral parts of the human being. Besides the biological needs of food and shelter, there 
are basic needs that relate to growth and development.  
 
They are seen in the unsatisfied needs of individuals and groups engaged in ethnic and 
identity struggles; unless satisfied, these needs will spawn behavior outside the legal 
norms of society (Burton 1990, 36). Values are those acquired “ideas, habits, customs, 
and beliefs” that are characteristic of social communities. They spring from “linguistic, 
religious, class, ethnic, or other features” possessed by various cultures and identity 
groups. “In conditions of oppression, discrimination, under privilege, and isolation, the 
defense of values is important to the needs of personal security and identity,” and can be 
confused with needs. “Preservation of values is a reason for defensive and aggressive 
behaviors” (Burton 1990, 37). 
 
In contrast, he says, “Interests refer to the occupational, social, political, and economic 
aspirations” of individuals and identity groups. “They typically relate to material goods 
or role occupancy,” and can change with circumstances. They are not an inherent part of 
the individual as are needs or values (Burton 1990, 38). Interests are negotiable and can 
be traded for social gain. In contrast, needs and values, such as those for identity or 
recognition, are inherent drives and cannot be traded. Conflict involving needs and values 
can easily become deep-rooted conflict. For example, individuals cannot be coerced to 
accept democratic rule that denies their ethnic or cultural identity (Burton 1990, 39).  
 
This theory therefore becomes workable in explaining the intricate link between violence 
and democracy in Nigeria where the levels of political engagement by the youth have 
fallen drastically over the last decade; in which participating in the formal political system 
appear not to provide a platform for the expression of grievance, yearnings and aspirations 
by them. Youth have continued to become the victims of exclusion and policy neglect by 
the government on issues affecting them in the country. This invariably weaken their 
commitment to democracy and encourage them to support forms of authority from non-
state actors such as Boko Haram in the North-Eastern geo-political zone and bodies of 
organized crime perpetrators who specialized in cattle rustling, kidnapping and banditry 
in the North-West geo-political zone. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Why have democratization processes failed to fulfil expectations of violence reduction in 
Northern Nigerian? How does violence affect democracy and vice versa?  When 
examined critically, the interfaces between Democracy, violence and security lead to two 
important conclusions: the diverse ethnic and religious configuration in Nigeria breeds 
tension while the lack of proper internalized democratic values fails to neutralized such 
tension which lead to conflict and violence. The violence thus interacts perversely with 
democratic institutions, eroding their legitimacy and effectiveness.  
 
Even though violent conflict in Nigeria precedes the restoration of democratic transition 
in 1999, the intensity of violence and bloodshed in virtually all geo-political zones at one 
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time or the other in the present democratic dispensation calls for concern (Kalu, & 
Gberevbie, 2018). It suffices to argue that, failure of democracy constitutes the major 
cause of violent conflict in Nigeria. This is because when there is popular participation 
(inclusiveness), the government is responsive to citizen’s yearnings and aspirations, the 
political office holders are accountable to the public for their action and there is 
transparency in governance the citizens will have less cause for violent opposition 
(Cederman, Hug & Krebs, 2010). Failure of democracy has therefore provided 
unsatisfactory conditions upon which the idea of violence was nurtured and propagated 
in the sense that in Nigerian, a combination of political and institutional factors; weak 
state institutions, elite power struggles and political exclusion, breakdown in social 
contract and corruption, identity politics and ethnic rivalry have contributed to violence 
and conflict.  
Also contributed were socioeconomic factors such as ethnicity, marginalization, absence 
or deterioration of social cohesion, and unequal distribution of the state resources. 
O'Sullivan and Stewart (1999), accept that the conditions for violent conflict can be 
generated by state weakness. Any democracy that is unable to peacefully manage 
different group interests to provide adequate group security, or to satisfy increasing 
demands for political participation, can fracture societies. To this end, confusion and 
collective fears for the future in contemporary Nigeria, stemming from state weakness, 
clientelism and indiscriminate repression, leading to the emergence of armed reactions by 
marginalized young people (Nwatu, 2018).  
 
It is important to remember that in Nigeria, ethnic origin, religion and regional 
calculations are the basis for the system of rules regulating state-society relations and the 
allocation of resources, rights and responsibilities. Expenditure on social security and 
meeting the population's basic needs remains very low. The enormous oil revenue by the 
nation rakes in annual corruption and graft gulps. Revolt and violent confrontation are 
not unlikely in this kind of setting. The state's failure to provide basic services, including 
justice and security, to everyone has diminished the credibility of the state and the 
confidence of citizens in democratic institutions. (Emmanuel & Onyige, 2019).  
 
There is obviously an intricate link between democracy, violence and insecurity in 
Nigeria, in the sense that since independence the country has lost billions of dollars to 
large-scale corruption and has consistently been ranked as one of the countries exhibiting 
government collapse and fragile democratic institutions (Nwatu, 2018). Governance 
failure has denied millions of youth opportunities, resulting in unemployment and mass 
poverty, where some of the idle youth are easily recruited by anti-state and militia groups. 
It is important to note that despite relatively strong economic development, poverty has 
increased in Nigeria; 112.5 million-over 70% of the population is categorized as poor and 
totally poor where the North East, the main operational area of Boko Haram, has the worst 
poverty rate of the six geo-political zones (Yusuf, 2018). 
 
The declining human development resources due to failure of governance is therefore the 
root causes of the violent conflict in northern Nigeria where the country’s dysfunctional 
democratic institutions have tragically failed significant numbers of youth (Ijere, 2015) 
Key human development sectors education, health and the judiciary, as well as security 
agencies are poorly funded or underperforming. Underfunding of the judiciary with a 
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third of the 330,000 police employed by senior politicians and businessmen as private 
escorts. Nigerians lack security but not their leaders (Wonah, & Chujor, 2019).  
Therefore, this generates a profound sense of dissatisfaction and alienation, especially by 
young people who are perhaps the most acute in the northern region, thus creating the 
emergence of insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, cattle rustlers, kidnappers and 




This paper is not an argument that insecurity and violence in Nigeria can exhaustively be 
attributed to the collapse of democracy and democratic institutions. The paper's stance is 
that democratic failure in both structures and institutions have created the environment to 
nurture frustration, grievances, rivalry, and alienation which stems the tides of violent 
conflict. Democracy must be supported by strong institutions to set and implement the 
rules of the game and ensure sustainable economic governance to eradicate poverty and 
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